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Motor skills are held to provide paradigm examples of tacit knowledge but knowledge
management researchers have overlooked decades of research and theorising on motor skills.
A review of this field shows it to be undergoing considerable intellectual debate between
information-processing and dynamic systems models. The former support the notion of tacit
knowledge, but dynamic systems models do not, nor do emerging multi-level models. Some
implications for knowledge management research and practice are outlined.
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Introduction
It is widely agreed that tacit knowledge is important to organizations and to the theory
and practice of knowledge management. Nonaka and his colleagues  make it central
to  their  model  of  organizational  knowledge  creation  (Nonaka  &  Takeuchi,  1995).
Baumard (1999, p.  8) argued that  it is critical both to daily management,  and as a
firm’s  source  of  competitive  advantage  (see  also  Spender,  1996,  Ambrosini  &
Bowman,  2001),  a  notion  that  complements  Nonaka’s  emphasis.  Tacit  knowledge
transfer  is  regarded as  particularly  problematic  since it  can only  be ‘embedded’  in
people and culture (Argote & Ingram, 2000).
On the other hand it  is a difficult  concept;  it  resists operationalization (Ambrosini  &
Bowman,  2001;  Spender,  1996)  and  carries  too  many  meanings.  Spender  (1996)
distinguished conscious, automatic, and collective practical knowledge as three types
of tacit knowledge. A recent review of empirical phenomena to which the label tacit
knowledge was applied identified six distinct ways in which the phrase has been used,
excluding ‘collective’ references (Gourlay 2004a). Claims that tacit knowledge cannot
be examined empirically because it is unconscious (Easterby-Smith & Lyles, 2003), or
that it is ineffable (Tsoukas, 2003) only lend support to Donaldson’s (2001) charge of
mystification. 
Reviewing applications of the term to empirical observations is one way to clarify the
meaning of the term. Another is through conceptual critique, interrogation of sources,
and  philosophical  debate  –  after  all,  the  phrase  emerged  from  Polanyi’s  various
philosophical writings (e.g. Polanyi,  1962; 1966).  Gourlay (2004b) explored some of
Polanyi’s writings,  and concluded that  we have failed to notice he wrote principally
about tacit  knowing, a process, and not a form of knowledge. In fact, within Polanyi’s
framework, there is little or no room for the idea of a kind of  knowledge that is tacit.
Others  (e.g.  Janik,  1988;  Tsoukas,  2003,  and  Collins,  1974,  2001a)  have  drawn
inspiration from Wittgenstein, but recently Pleasants (1996) argued that Wittgenstein’s
philosophy is wholly inimical to the idea of a personal knowledge on the lines Polanyi
endorsed. It seems we are unlikely to progress much along this route.
This  paper  takes  a  different  approach,  trying  to  ‘unpack’  the  notion  by  exploring
research into a class of behaviours loosely labelled as ‘motor skills’. After making the
case for this approach, the paper reviews the major conceptual approaches found in
this broad field, and in conclusion, draws out some implications for the concept of tacit
knowledge as regards motor skills.
Why “motor skills”?
Tacit knowledge and motor skills
The reason for focusing on motor skills is simple: they “supply a set of paradigmatic
examples of tacit knowledge in everyday life” (MacKenzie, 1996, p. 215) and bicycle
riding  is  a  particularly  good  example  because,  Collins  argues,  even  if  we  could
formulate rules for riding a bicycle, they would be of little use to a non-rider (Collins
2001a). The prominence of bicycle riding is due to Polanyi who wrote that “If  I know
how to ride a bicycle or how to swim, this does not mean that I can tell how I manage
to keep my balance on a bicycle or keep afloat when swimming.” (Polanyi, 1969a, p.
141). In  Personal Knowledge (1962, pp. 49-50) he noted that “the principle by which
the cyclist maintains his balance is not generally known” but, went on to describe in
detail that cyclists maintain their balance by steering in the direction of imbalance, thus
correcting it. Later he was more explicit writing that “in order to compensate for a given
angle of imbalance a, we must take a curve on the side of the imbalance, of which the
radius (r) should be proportionate to the square of the velocity (v) over the imbalance”
(Polanyi, 1969, p. 144). Since successful cyclists evidently know these facts, but are
unable to articulate it, this knowledge is tacit. 
We might well ask how Polanyi could give such accounts if this knowledge was tacit?
He cited no sources for his information, and we have simply been left with his authority
on the matter. He was right that little was known about bicycle riding as a review of
research written in 1979 only found 21 papers of which only four dealt with the rider’s
contribution to control  (Doyle 1988).  However,  Polanyi was completely wrong in his
account of how cyclists ride and keep their balance. 
Doyle (1988) conducted one of the rare studies of bicycle riding, and confirmed that
riders do not  have a clear  idea of  what  they are doing.  When  it  comes  to turning
corners he noted most riders believe they initiate a turn by turning the handle bars in
the direction they wish to go (as Polanyi wrote). In fact, however, the opposite is the
case, as he showed by observing the marks made by wet tyres on a dry surface: “If we
enter a turn quickly ... we can see that the front wheel turns momentarily away from
the desired direction before making the turn ...” (Doyle, 1988 p. 26). 
Polanyi appears to have been mistaken – along with most others – in his account of
how bicycle riders maintain balance while cornering. This is important because while
he says that knowledge of the explicit rule would not be of use to a cyclist, he claimed
that a rule such as he described is actually followed, which is not the case. From one
perspective this merely deepens the mystery: Polanyi believed he had formulated the
tacit rules for maintaining balance on a bicycle when in fact he had done nothing of the
sort – the rules remained tacit! On the other hand it illustrates some of the problems
with assertions  about  tacit  knowledge,  namely,  that  while it  is  often invoked as an
explanatory factor, there is usually absolutely no evidence to support the claim, and its
use actually amounts to little more than a re-labelling of  a problem. In the case of
bicycle riding, it may not be necessary to invoke the idea of tacit rules/knowledge at all
(Doyle 1988).
Motor skills – the field(s)
The term “motor skills” is used in this paper for convenience, and because it is familiar
in  management  and  organization  studies’  circles.  Gallahue  and  Ozmun’s  textbook
(1998, pp. 17-18) defines motor, motor learning, behaviour, control and development
as  well  as  movement,  movement  pattern  and  movement  skill,  but  not  motor  skill.
However, it is clear that, broadly speaking, motor skills in the sense Polanyi and others
writing about tacit knowledge used it refers to the fields covered by these terms. 
Laszlo  (1992),  referring  to  motor  control,  lists  a  number  of  pertinent  disciplines,
including anatomy, physiology, psychology, human movement science, bioengineering,
education, neurology, and sport medicine. Comprehensive as the list seems, Laszlo
omits cognitive science, kinaesology (Abernethy & Sparrow, 1992), motor development
(Gallahue & Ozmun 1998); motor behaviour and skill (Kelso 1982a); and movement
behaviour (Summers, 1992). This is not to criticize Laszlo, but to underscore her point
that the field as a whole is vast and multi-disciplinary, and one that few if any people
can actually bridge.  This can cause difficulties and misdirected effort.  For example,
psychologists  largely failed  to  take account  of  research  on central  nervous system
functioning in the 1970s which showed that “the classical view of strict separation of
motor and sensory areas in the cortex was incorrect” (Laszlo, 1992, p. 48).
Addressing the motor control/skills field, Laszlo argued that “if  we are to arrive at a
unified body of knowledge of how movements are controlled and skills acquired, and
guard against promulgation of theories in our own discipline which conflict with facts
which have been established outside our own field.” (1992, p. 48), then we have no
alternative but to try to draw together these diverse bodies of knowledge. This clearly
expresses the sentiments motivating the present paper.
If the task of synthesis of research relevant to motor skills is difficult for people working
within one of the sub-disciplines, it is perhaps even more difficult for someone like the
present  author  coming  from  an  entirely  different  background,  a  niche  region
(management and organization studies) of the social sciences. The task of being a
stranger in a foreign land seeking to understand local culture and bring back some
useful (and not mis-understood) nuggets for management studies is made easier than
might at first seem. First, motor skills’ studies entered a paradigm crisis in the 1980s
which is apparently still unresolved, as a result of which several of the natives were
driven to  reflect  on their  discipline  as  a whole  making  it  easier  for  an outsider  to
understand. Second, it turns out that much of the discussion reflected parallel debates
in the behavioural and cognitive sciences. Thus motor skills’ debates, at least at a level
appropriate to the present paper, may not be too foreign after all.
While there is general agreement on the existence of a paradigm crisis there is no
agreement on the names for the paradigms. Thus we find the labels computational,
top-down, cognitive,  constructivist,  indirect,  information-processing,  prescriptive,  and
movement  systems  approaches  contrasted  with  dynamic  systems,  bottom-up,
ecological,  action  systems,  and  emergent  perspectives  (Goldfield,  1993;  Burgess-
Limerick,  Abernethy & Limerick,  1994;  Williams,  Davids,  Burwitz & Williams,  1992;
Handford,  Davids,  Bennett,  & Button,  1997; Summers,  1992;  Abernethy & Sparrow
1992).  On a  more  philosophical  plane the  conflict  has been described in  terms  of
indirect versus direct realism (Carello, Turvey, Kugler & Shaw 1984). In the absence of
a  consensus  the  terms  information-processing  or  cognitive  approaches,  and
dynamic/ecological  systems  approaches  are  used  here  since  these  labels  indicate
essential and contrasting features of the two paradigms.
Tacit knowledge in motor skills’ research
Before examining the different paradigms in motor skills research it is worth noting that
the  attention  of  motor  skills  researchers  has  been drawn to  the  concept.  In  1990
Davids and Myers reviewed research on complex work systems, as well as Polanyi’s
writings, that highlighted the significance of “an often indefinable and implicit level of
knowledge”  (p.  273),  tacit  knowledge.  They  argued  that  movement  performance
studies  had  neglected  this  and  urged  that  greater  priority  should  be  placed  on
understanding how tacit knowledge develops. Their call appears to have fallen on deaf
ears since only one other paper in the field has used the term (Blais, [1993], found too
late to be reviewed here) and Davids and Myers’ paper has rarely been cited. While
this clearly suggests that researchers in this field do not find the term useful, it does
not  mean  that  the  concept  is  absent  from  their  theories.  The  review of  the  main
paradigms will show whether this is the case or not.
Motor skills research – a historical outline
The study of  movement  control,  at  least  by psychologists,  dates from the late 19th
century, but it was only with the development of the information-processing approach
during  the  1950s  and  a  shift  from  focusing  on  movement  products  to  movement
processes  that  modern  research  and  understanding  began  to  develop  (Pew  &
Rosenbaum, 1988; Kelso, 1982a). In the late 1960s there were still only two specialist
journals (Abernethy & Sparrow, 1992) and it took until the 1970s for an institutionalized
academic approach to human movement studies to began (Bootsma & Hardy 1997). 
Using content and citation analysis of the  Journal of Motor Behavior, Abernethy and
Sparrow (1992) demonstrated that during the 1970s three related groups of theories
dominated research, all of which are information-processing theories. From the early
1980s these were increasingly challenged by dynamic systems approaches which had
become the dominant paradigm by the 1990s (Gallahue and Ozmun, 1998). It remains
unclear,  however,  to  what  extent  this  shift  is  complete,  as  arguments  from  a
computational (i.e. information-processing) perspective continue to be made (Wolpert,
Ghahramani & Flanagan 2001).  Moreover,  talk  of  a rapprochement (e.g.  Summers,
1992;  Pressing,  1999;  Abernethy,  Hanna  &  Plooy,  2002)  raises  the  question  of
whether or the differences really are fundamental.
Information processing or cognitive approaches. The first testable model of motor
control was Adams’ closed-loop feedback model (Stelmach, 1982; Williams, Davids &
Williams,  1999).  Adams  proposed  that  movement  was  controlled  by  an  internal
comparison between incoming information about the ongoing movement, and stored
information formed during previous successful  movement.  Thus deviations from the
goal could be detected, and corrections made (Abernethy & Sparrow 1992; Stelmach
1982).
The closed-loop approach could explain the control of slow movements, where there
was time for receipt of incoming information and its processing. It could not account for
rapid  movements,  such  as  characterise  many  sports  as  well  as  more  natural
movements,  where movement time occupies less than the available feedback time,
given the processing constraints of the nervous system (Abernethy & Sparrow 1992;
Schmidt  1982a).  Nor  could  closed-loop  models  explain  how people  could  produce
movement in the absence of feedback information (Abernethy & Sparrow 1992). 
By the mid-1970s closed-loop based research was giving way to open-loop models
and the idea of a motor program to control movement in which Schmidt was a leading
figure.  One way of  explaining how it is possible for  people to complete movements
before there is time for  feedback processes to  be effective relies on the idea that
“subjects structure their movement in advance, and this structure is termed the motor
program.” (Schmidt, 1982a, p. 196; his emphasis). Early definitions of motor program
implied that organisms must possess a vast number of programs in order to account
for  all  an individual’s  actions,  which raised problems about  storage,  and about  the
acquisition of novel actions (Schmidt, 1982b). In the face of continuing observational
anomalies Schmidt advanced the idea of the generalized motor program or schema
model of motor control (Abernethy & Sparrow, 1992; Schmidt, 1982a, b). 
The schema model proposed that with experience essential rules about the relations
between the acting organism and its environment would be abstracted and stored, thus
providing a flexible framework for  guiding movement  (Abernethy & Sparrow, 1992).
Such a “generalised  program” (Schmidt, 1982b, p. 221) solves both the storage and
novelty problems at the same time. However, attractive as the idea is, it has received
only  equivocal  evidential  support  (Abernethy  & Sparrow,  1992).  If  there  are  stored
invariants of given classes of movements we would expect an experienced athlete, for
example, to show little variation in gait or footfall when executing the run-up to a jump.
Experiment and observations show that in fact there is considerable variation from one
run to the next (Williams, et al., 1999; Handford et al., 1997).
The  information  processing  approach  models  the  workings  of  organisms  on  the
analogy of  a  computer  program (Pew & Rosenbaum,  1988;  Williams  et  al.,  1992)
placing  particular  emphasis  on  the  notions  of  internal  representations,  and
computational  processes (the  means  whereby representations  are  formed)  (Pew &
Rosenbaum, 1988). Following Meijer (1988, quoted in Williams et al.,  1992, p. 165;
see  also  Williams  et  al.,  1999)  information  processing  models  assume  organisms
receive  meaningless  input  stimuli  that  they  convert  via  internal  processes  into
meaningful  representations that guide movement.  Representations are a particularly
important  in  this  approach  being  internalized  knowledge  structures  or  programs
recording movements (Williams et al.,  1992; Handford et al.,  1997).  Philosophically,
the approach is consistent with the ideas of indirect realism (Carello et al., 1984) or
representational realism (Burgess-Limerick et al., 1994).
While information processing models proved useful in stimulating research in this field,
as elsewhere,  from the mid-1980s they were criticised on a number of  grounds.  In
sports science, anomalous observations and doubts about the ecological validity of the
laboratory based experiments that dominated information-processing based research
in sports research led to some unease (Williams et al.,  1992).  Carello et al.  (1984)
questioned the principle of applying computer models to living systems arguing that as
the former are determinate systems (being strictly bound by their initial conditions) and
living systems are nondeterminate, being only loosely bound by initial conditions, the
computer model is wholly inappropriate. Furthermore, discrete symbol systems, such
as  computer  systems,  are  based  on  representations  which  themselves  are
abstractions from dynamic systems. Thus there is an error of  logic in attempting to
model  the latter on the former.  The notion of  a program, and representations,  also
implicitly invokes the notion of a user ‘internal’ to the organism, a problem entailing an
infinite regress (Kelso, 1982b). It was in this general context of the continued inability
of  information  processing  models  to  cope  with  new observations,  and  critiques  by
authors  such as Kelso, Kugler,  and Turvey, amongst  others,  that  dynamic systems
approaches were proposed, and rapidly came to dominate research.
Dynamic/ecological  systems  approaches.  One  particular  problem  information
processing approaches faced was the degrees of freedom problem (Smith & Thelen,
1993). Turvey, Fitch and Tuller (1982) pointed out that on a conservative estimate of
the  number  of  muscle  motor  units  involved  in  moving  the  human  arm  requires
regulation of 2600 degrees of freedom. Assuming that only the joints needs regulating
reduces the problem to the control of seven degrees of freedom, but even this, they
argue, would be very difficult for a computational system. Moreover, this only covers a
small part of the degrees of freedom problem, for the ‘same’ movement is not always
produced in exactly the same way internally, and account still has to be taken of the
varied contexts within which movements occur yet are functionally the same for the
organism (Clark, Truly & Phillips 1993).
Dynamic  systems  approaches  were  able  to  provide  explanations,  and  to  inform
experimental  studies,  for  these  kinds  of  problems.  According  to  Abernethy  and
Sparrow (1992) some of the strongest evidence supporting these approaches came
from studies of bimanual linkage, the production of speech, and transitions between
different forms of gait that relied entirely on modelling the physical properties involved
in the movements. An increasingly dominant view in the motor control literature on the
transition from walking to running, for example, views “gait as a self-organised system
with transitions between the walking and running gaits as automatic consequences of
the collective structure of the human neuro-muscular-skeletal system” (Abernethy et
al.,  2002,  p.  256).  Movement  coordination  is  thus  seen  as  a  consequence  of  the
relationship  between  the  physical  nature  of  the  body,  and  the  environmental
constraints  (and  opportunities)  in  which  it  moves  (Burgess-Limerick  et  al.,  1994;
Thelen & Smith, 1994). 
The dynamic systems approach in motor skills research was inspired by a number of
developments including ecological psychology, and work on coordination and control
(Abernethy & Sparrow 1992; Williams et al., 1992), that were merged to become what
some call the “action systems” perspective (Williams et al.,  1992, p. 163; see Reed
1996).  These  approaches  share  a  number  of  common  features  and  assumptions:
direct  realism;  rejection  of  mind/matter,  organism/environment  and  other  dualisms;
rejection of the need for representations; and the assumption that the appropriate unit
of  analysis  must  be  the  organism  in  its  environment  wherein  both  organism  and
environment  are mutually constraining  (Williams et  al.,  1992;  Williams et  al.,  1999;
Burgess-Limerick et al.,  1994; Reed 1996). There is no central pattern generator or
controller in the organism driving coordination, which, instead,  is attributable to “the
natural resonant properties of the body” acting in its environment (Goldfield, 1993, p.
54).  The approach has been called a bottom-up approach (Burgess-Limerick et al.,
1994)  because  it  models  movement  organization  control  as  emerging  from  the
dynamic self-assembly of the units, such as the muscle motor units referred to above,
of which movement is comprised (Abernethy & Sparrow, 1992).
Dynamic  systems  and  related  approaches  have  had  much  success  and  were
particularly  welcomed  in  developmental  research  (Thelen  &  Smith,  1994;  Smith  &
Thelen, 1993). Roberton (1993) for example notes three points of appeal: the attempt
to account for qualitative change; a ‘whole systems’ approach that also utilised models
of high scientific generality; and, finally, parsimony, eliminating the need to postulate
(implicitly or otherwise) internal structures or processes, such as motor programs and
the like, for which there was little or no empirical evidence. 
However, these approaches are not without their difficulties. One important problem is
the lack of a clear theory of learning (Abernethy & Sparrow 1992; Smith & Samuelson,
2003). Research and observations showing that people can ‘overcome’ or modify the
kinds of natural movement co-ordination patterns dynamic systems research was so
good at accounting for also posed problems. Human walking racers, for example, have
to resist the automatic transition to running that would naturally occur at the speeds
they walk at, and the spatial and temporal coupling of two hands moving rhythmically
can be uncoupled with continued practice (Abernethy & Sparrow, 1992; Summers &
Pressing,  1994;  Abernethy,  et  al.,  2002).  These  problems,  and  more  theoretical
critique,  have  stimulated  attempts  to  seek  a  rapprochement  between  the  two
paradigms.
Towards a rapprochement? If the difference between the information-processing and
dynamic systems approaches is to be called a paradigm difference, then the prospects
for a rapprochement should be slim if not non-existent. Abernethy and Sparrow (1992)
summarized  deep  points  of  difference,  noting  in  particular  that  philosophical
differences  (indirect  versus  direct  realism)  and  the  concomitant  methodological
implications, leading each camp to ask different and incomparable research questions
(Burgess-Limerick et al., 1994; Williams et al., 1992) all point to an irreconcilable gulf.
Abernethy and Sparrow envisaged a “protracted crisis rather than rapid merger” (1992,
p. 5), while Bootsma and Hardy (1997) in a paper subtitled “Half-time comments on the
match” noted that  there was still  a deep-running controversy over which framework
should be embraced. 
Even in the early days of emergence of the dynamic systems view, however, Pew and
Rosenbaum (1988) among others (see Abernethy & Sparrow, 1992) suggested that
rather  than  competing  to  explain  the  same  phenomena  the  two  approaches  were
operating at different levels of analysis. Abernethy and Sparrow also suggested there
was  some  evidence  to  support  “the  hybrid  view of  a  multi-levelled  motor  system”
(1992, pp. 31-2) with automatic control  at one level (explicable in dynamic systems
terms), and cognitive controls (modelled by information-processing theory) at another.
In 1999, Pressing published his “referential behavior theory”, a hybrid model that he
claimed was supported by existing studies and observations.
The case for a synthesis would seem to be gathering pace. Abernethy et al. (2002, p.
257)  noted  that  a  synthesis  was emerging,  writing:  “a  useful  model  for  examining
motor control in a range of coordinative tasks might be one in which control is seen to
be multi-levelled, with intention (or, more generally, cognition) overriding or modifying
the natural self-organising dynamics of the motor system.” Research on the control of
gait in walking to running transitions designed to test the multi-level hypothesis showed
that  normal  transitions  occur  spontaneously  but  when  the  normal  transition  was
inhibited  (e.g.  as  with  walking  racers)  “active  cognitive involvement  in  gait  control”
occurs (Abernethy et al., 2002, p. 263). The automaticity of normal walk-run transitions
is consistent with dynamical systems models, but, it seems they would have difficulty
coping  with  ‘active  cognitive  involvement’.  A  widely  accepted  unified  theory  still
remains to be developed and the field is still in the midst of what perhaps can justifiably
be called a paradigm crisis.
Motor skills theories and tacit knowledge
We have seen that there are few explicit references to “tacit knowledge” in research-
based literature  on motor  skills  and cognate  disciplines.  Davids and Myers’  (1990)
paper was an appeal to sports science researchers to attend to the study of work skills
where the notion of tacit knowledge had been invoked, but was largely ignored by their
research community. Blais (1993, abstract),  however, says there is an emphasis on
“automated and tacit knowledge” in the motor domain, and much sports knowledge is
probably  unconscious  and  implicit  (Williams  et  al.,  1999)  When  researchers  are
dealing  with  how infants  learn  to  crawl  and  walk  the  question  of  verbalizing  that
knowledge clearly does not arise. Overall,  in so far as it  has been discussed there
appears to be a consensus that motor skills ‘knowledge’ is largely non-verbalizable,
and thus ‘tacit’.
Much of  the research into knowledge in sports  discussed by Williams et  al.  (1999)
seems to have been conducted from within the information-processing paradigm. The
position  of  dynamic  systems oriented  research  is  more  difficult  to  ascertain.  While
these theories do entertain a notion of knowledge (Smith & Samuelson, 2003) this is
quite  different  from  traditional  approaches.  Moreover,  as  we  have  seen,  dynamic
systems approaches lack a theory of  learning such as could justify the idea of  the
‘accumulation’ of knowledge within an organism as is characteristic of the information-
processing models. 
To explore the issue of whether motor skills paradigms do support the notion of tacit
knowledge we have to address the question of how we can relate that research to the
notion of tacit knowledge. Use of the phrase by the few writers in that field may not
correspond to uses in management disciplines, while lack of use of the phrase may
simply reflect a different vocabulary. One good approach, it seems, is to outline the
logic of the argument for tacit knowledge, and then to see to what extent this matches
any of the motor skills theories.
The logical justification for  the claim that tacit  knowledge exists in some sense has
apparently  not  been  set  out,  at  least  not  in  knowledge  management  literature.  It
seems, however, that whether we follow what we believe to be Polanyi’s arguments
(since Polanyi was concerned with tacit knowing rather than tacit  knowledge [Gourlay
2004b]) or take our inspiration from Wittgenstein (e.g. Collins, 1974, 2001a; Tsoukas,
2003) the logic  is the same. The implicit  argument  is simply that  if  someone does
something, but is unable to give an account of their actions, then they must have relied
on tacit knowledge. In short, any ‘doing’ is assumed to be underpinned by knowledge
of some sort, and if the agent cannot make that knowledge explicit (i.e. by verbalizing
it),  then  self-evidently  it  is  tacit  knowledge.  Thus,  for  example  we find  that  when
lawyers  can  determine  critical  case  factors  and  build  an  argument  (Marchant  &
Robinson, 1999), or salesmen know how to maximise situations (Wagner, Sujan, J.,
Sujan, M., Rachotte, & Sternberg, 1999), or scientists correctly set up an experiment
(Collins, 2001b), or people apply social rules (Collins, 2001a), or nurses have correct
intuitions about patients’ conditions (Herbig,  Büssing & Ewart,  2001) but in none of
these cases can the actors explain their behaviour, the presence and effect of tacit
knowledge is invoked as a critical explanatory factor. (This logic deserves criticism, but
that is not the purpose of this paper; here we are simply concerned with comparing this
explanatory strategy with motor skills theories).
If  we  accept  the  above  as  a  valid  statement  of  the  logic  of  ‘tacit  knowledge’
explanations, then it is evident that in inferring the presence of tacit knowledge from
behaviour these and other authors are following what Bechtel (1998, p. 297) called a
“major strategy in cognitive science”. This consists of explaining “how ... an organism
is successful in negotiating its environment by construing some of its internal states or
processes as carrying information about, and so standing in for, those aspects of its
body and external  states  that  it  takes account  of  in negotiating its  environment.”  It
should  also  be  apparent  that  this  is  the  same  explanatory  strategy  and  central
assumption as underpins the information-processing approach.  Moreover,  reviewing
Polanyi’s arguments, it is clear they too fit this model. His central claim was that the
focal object we perceive and operate with or on is constructed by internal processes of
tacit inference operating on the “subsidiaries” of the focal object that we tacitly ‘take in’
(see e.g. Polanyi, 1966; 1969; Gourlay 2004b). Given the increasing dominance of the
information-processing paradigm in all spheres of inquiry since the 1950s it should not
be at  all  surprising  to  find that  this  underlies Polanyi’s arguments,  nor that  we are
largely unaware of this fact, and that it appears as common-sense to most of us. After
all, it is (still) the dominant paradigm!
The  question  of  representations.  One  important  area  in  which  information-
processing and dynamic systems approaches differ is that of representations, and it
appears this is of particular importance as regards conceptualizing knowledge in either
tacit or explicit form. In pursuing this discussion, however briefly in this context, as the
issue concerns not just motor skills theories and research, but the cognitive sciences
more generally (Bechtel,  1998),  it  becomes clear  that  pursuit  of  tacit  knowledge is
taking us both further afield than motor skills, and closer to knowledge management, in
so far as cognitive science concepts have already informed that discipline.
Bechtel  drew  attention  to  two  issues  regarding  representations  on  which  dynamic
systems’  views  apparently  diverged  from  or  even  opposed  classical  approaches.
These are the issue of  function (representations as stand-ins) and the issue of  the
form or format of representations. Classic cognitive science regards representations as
stand-ins – they are internal states of organisms that stand in for or represent aspects
of  body  and  environment,  and  their  relations,  relevant  to  the  organism’s  ability  to
negotiate its environment (Bechtel 1998, pp. 297-8). This has been described as the
classic symbol system view of cognition (Smith & Samuelson 2003, p. 434). Dynamic
systems’  approaches  reject  this  idea  (Bechtel  1998,  pp.  296-7,  301)  but  Bechtel
rejected  their  arguments  against  stand-ins,  concluding  that  dynamic  systems’
approaches do not offer good grounds for rejecting representations (Bechtel 1998, pp.
301-4).  He  admits  that  this  entails  making  some  very  broad  assumptions  about
representations, but, as his dynamic systems opponents did the same, he was justified
in so doing (Bechtel 1998, p. 313).
As regards the format of representations, Bechtel (1998, pp. 299-300) drew attention
to the significance of the distinction between representations as something  operated
on  in  processes,  and  representations  operating  in processes.  The  classic
computational approaches to cognitive processes envisaged representations as being
operated  on,  and,  partly as a consequence,  being propositional  (Bechtel  1998,  pp.
299-300). On the other hand representations that operate in processes, such as found
in  connectionist  models,  and  in  neuroscience,  are  non-propositional  and  can  be
dynamic (Bechtel 1998, p. 300). It  would appear, as he stresses (Bechtel 1998, pp.
300, 305) “that  cognitive scientists  have explored a wide variety of  representational
formats” while proponents of the dynamic systems’ views emphasis only one format.
Bechtel goes further to note that some dynamic systems authors clearly do accept a
notion of  representations  and argues that  their  hostility  to  representations probably
stems from focusing on propositional  type representations  while they are willing to
accept  other,  dynamic,  kinds  of  representations.  Thus,  he concludes,  an important
contribution of  dynamic systems’  approaches is that  they focus “on representations
that change as the system evolves.” (Bechtel 1998, p. 305). 
Bechtel  also considers  another  way in which dynamic systems’  theorists’  views on
representations  could  be  accommodated  within  the  more  traditional  framework  by
suggesting that dynamicists repudiate high level representations, but accept low level
ones. High level representations are those such as concepts designating objects in the
world,  linguistic  symbols  and  the  like.  Simpler,  lower  level  (i.e.  more  fundamental
building blocks of organic behaviour) representations, or, implicitly, situations in which
the objects the organism is concerned with are present (and thus do not require being
represented in order for the organism to consider them) might only require dynamic
representations. Dynamic systems’ theorists,  he suggests, might thus be making us
ask whether or not high level representations are actually necessary to understanding
many varieties  of  behaviour  (Bechtel  1998,  p.  305).  Bechtel  thus  provides  indirect
support for the multi-level model of behavioural processes similar to that suggested by
Abernethy and others, noted above.
Bechtel’s arguments receive some support  from two authors,  one of  whom (Smith)
has extensively used dynamic systems models (Smith & Samuelson 2003; see e.g.
Smith & Thelen 1993). Bechtel, as we have seen, suggested that connectionist and
dynamic  system’s  approaches  shared  the  property  of  accepting  non-propositional,
dynamic,  representations.  Smith  and Samuelson  note  that  both  connectionism and
dynamic systems approaches were founded in opposition to classic cognitive science,
and concur with Bechtel’s argument about levels. However,  they argued,  instead of
viewing cognition as dependent on manipulating representations both connectionism
and dynamic  systems view “cognition  was an emergent  phenomenon,  grounded in
lower, simpler and non-symbolic processes” (Smith & Samuelson 2003, p. 434). In the
early days both these approaches eschewed representations entirely, more recently
the idea of representations has received something of a reprieve, although it should be
noted these are quite different from either representations as operated on or operating
in. Now, claim Smith and Samuelson (2003, p. 434; their emphasis), “all that is meant
by representations ...  is that the  theorist can see correspondences between internal
patterns and regularities in the world.” This implies that in more recent connectionist
and dynamic systems models a ‘representation’ is simply a conceptual artefact rather
than  something  potentially  observable,  or  in  some  sense  compatible  with  biology,
‘implemented’ in an organism’s body, as Bechtel’s argument seems to entail.
Smith and Samuelson suggest that connectionist and dynamic systems’ approaches
“are  alike  in  that  they  are  emergentist  accounts  and  not  representational  symbol
systems”  (Smith  &  Samuelson  2003,  pp.  435)  but  also  note  that  they  are
complementary,  and not  identical.  One  important  difference  concerns  assumptions
about  knowledge.  For  connectionists,  knowledge resides in latent  connections in  a
network that are made active by immediate input; knowledge is distributed across the
network.  In  dynamic  systems models,  knowledge  is  emergent  in  the  moment,  “the
product  of  the intrinsic dynamics,  the state  of  the system at  that  moment,  and the
immediate input”; it is distributed across many kinds of processes - “perception, action,
the  hardness  of  the  floor  ...  There  is  no  analogue  of  latent  knowledge  ...  rather
knowledge is emergent  in the moment,  in the task,  out  of  the particulars  at  hand”
(Smith  & Samuelson  2003,  p.  436).  Thus  for  connectionists,  ‘knowledge’  is  ‘in  the
organism,  while  for  dynamicists,  it  is  distributed  across  organism-environment
processes; it is only ‘in’ the organism-environment activity unit.
Conclusions
Polanyi  could  be  excused  for  speculating  that  motor  skills  were  driven  by  tacit
knowledge  since  research  was then  in  its  infancy.  We,  however,  have  no  excuse
beyond the difficulties of cross-disciplinary understanding. Motor skills, which we claim
are paradigms of tacit knowledge have been studied extensively by others using more
rigourous methods. Unless we wish to reject  such efforts entirely we should ensure
that what we say about tacit knowledge is consistent with those studies. This naturally
entails  the  conclusion  that  if  the  notion  of  “tacit  knowledge”  turns  out  to  be
incompatible with conclusions in those fields, then we must question its continued use,
except perhaps as a loose metaphor. 
It would seem that the idea that actions are underpinned by some kind of knowledge
that is internal to the organism owes much to, and is consistent with, the information-
processing  approach  characteristic  of  traditional  cognitive  science,  and  applied  to
much motor skills research. Had this paper been written in the mid 1990s it would have
been easy to conclude, in the then enthusiasm for the dynamic systems perspectives,
that no case for tacit knowledge any longer be made because motor skills could be
explained  entirely  without  resort  to  any  kind  of  representation,  hence  knowledge,
internal to the organism. The advent of multi-level models, and clarification as regards
the variety of forms ‘representations’ might take, makes the picture more complex. 
The  ‘upper’  levels  of  multi-level  models  implicitly  involve  conscious  cognitive
processing, which in turn implies ‘knowledge’ that is readily explicable – there would be
no room for tacit knowledge here. The lower levels involve unconscious processing
which knowledge management writers at least would interpret as dependent on tacit
knowledge.  However,  as  we  have  seen,  the  dynamic  systems  (and  connectionist)
models that are good at explaining naturally occurring unconscious movements, do so
in terms inimical to any (conventional) notion of some form of knowledge held tacitly by
the organism.  Connectionist  models could be construed in this  way since for  them
knowledge, albeit distributed, is ‘in’ the organism. Dynamic systems models, however,
see  ‘knowledge’  as  distributed  ‘across’  the  organism-environment  boundary  –  in
Clark’s (1997, p. 53) memorable phrase, the mind is “leaky”! Both connectionists and
dynamicists see knowledge as being in some sense ‘dormant’ until activated or evoked
by  the  action  of  which  it  is  constitutive.  In  other  words,  there  no  knowledge
independent  of  the  action  to  which  the  knowledge  pertains  and  thus  no  “tacit
knowledge” apart from activity. 
Of  course,  it  could  be  argued  that  this  ‘explains’  why  tacit  knowledge  cannot  be
explicated  and  is  so  difficult  to  understand  –  it  does  not  exist  independently  of
behaviour, and is not in one ‘place’ in an organism (or perhaps is not even wholly ‘in’
the organism). The view taken here, however, is that such models renders the notion
irrelevant, except perhaps as a loose metaphor, reflecting the history of the knowledge
management discipline. 
On balance, it would seem that motor skills research does not provide support to a
notion of tacit knowledge. Instead, it seems that much motor behaviour is explicable as
either the emergent outcome of body-in-environment processes (not involving anything
identifiable as ‘knowledge’) or as the result of  conscious (and thus implicitly explicit
knowledge  using)  control  asserted  to  counter  natural  movement  tendencies.  This
suggests that knowledge management practice aimed at externalizing tacit knowledge
is  doing  nothing  of  the  sort,  but  is  merely  collecting  self-generated  (or  researcher
generated) descriptions of aspects of work that actors are largely unaware of, or take
for granted without realising their significance to someone else. If “tacit knowledge” is
inseparable from the behaviour allegedly underpinned by it, then there is nothing to be
‘explicated’. And, if mind, and knowledge, are ‘spread’ over both body and environment
in ways that make it difficult to think of explicating ‘knowledge’ as anything other than a
limited form of abstraction from a dynamic process.
A more radical implication is that perhaps we should start to take seriously models of
behaviour that use the organism-in-environment unit  of analysis,  such as ecological
psychology,  situated  cognition,  and  dynamic  systems  approaches.  Rather  than
focusing on individuals out of context, or only seeing individuals as interacting with (but
not fundamentally influencing,  or being influenced by) their  environment,  we should
see individual and environment as mutually constraining and enabling. 
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